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Abstract
We analyze the eect of public information on rational investors' incentives to reveal private
information during the bookbuilding process and their demand for allocations in the IPO. Our
model generates several new predictions. First, investors require more underpricing to truthfully
reveal positive private information in bear markets than in bull markets (the incentive eect).
Second, the proportion underpriced IPOs is higher when market conditions are favorable (the
demand eect). Combined, these two eects can explain why IPO rst-day returns are positively
related to pre-issue market returns, consistent with extant evidence. Using a sample of 5,000
U.S. IPOs from 1981-2008, we show that the empirical implications of the model are borne out
in the data.
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Extant evidence shows that rst-day returns in initial public oerings (IPOs) of equity are aected
by public information available before the nal oer price is set. In particular, rst-day stock
returns tend to increase with market-wide equity returns observed prior to the oering, suggesting
that underwriters fail to fully adjust oer prices for information that is widely known. As pointed
out by, e.g., Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2004), partial adjustment to
prior market returns is puzzling since it implies that underwriters compensate investors for easily
available public information.1
Several papers have analyzed the partial adjustment of the IPO oer price to public information.
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that irrational issuers care more for their newly discovered wealth
than for leaving \money on the table", bargaining the price less aggressively when market-wide
stock returns are high. Derrien (2005) proposes that investor sentiment correlated with market
conditions drives demand, and hence boosts the initial returns in hot market IPOs. In Edelen and
Kadlec (2005), a rational issuer sets the oer price by trading o the proceeds from a successful IPO
against the likelihood that the issue fails. If the rm's value is correlated to the market value of its
publicly traded peers, the rst-day returns will increase with industry-wide stock returns. Finally,
Sherman (2005) shows that partial adjustment will arise in a Benveniste and Spindt (1989) setup
if investors' opportunity costs of getting informed are higher when equity markets are performing
well.2
In the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model, underwriters compensate investors for truthfully
revealing private information during the bookbuilding period by giving them allocations of un-
derpriced shares. We expand their setting to include a public signal, which is unconditionally
correlated but conditionally uncorrelated to the private signal.3 In our model, public information
1See also Logue (1973), Hanley (1993), Bradley and Jordan (2002), Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu
(2003), and Kutsuna, Smith, and Smith (2009). Ince (2008) argues that the literature may understate the magnitude
of partial adjustment due to the omission of withdrawn deals. Using French IPOs, Derrien and Womack (2003)
show that the oer price adjusts more fully to market returns in auctions than in the bookbuilding process. Da,
Engelberg, and Gao (2009) and Liu, Sherman, and Zhang (2009) nd that IPO underpricing increases with pre-IPO
media coverage.
2See also Leite (2007), who shows that positive public information reduces adverse selection and thus the winner's
curse problem in a Rock (1986) setting. If issuers price the IPO more conservatively to increase the probability of
success, the degree of underpricing will be positively correlated to market returns.
3This positive correlation is a straightforward implication of Bayes' rule from the assumption that the public signal
and investors' private signals all are informative about the true underlying value of the rm. This is discussed further
below.
1aects the rst-day returns in two ways: through investors' demand for allocations and through
their incentives to truthfully reveal private information to the underwriter. Whenever the demand
eect dominates the incentive eect|which happens for a wide range of parameter values|the
issue price will adjust partially to public information.4
Our paper contributes to the IPO literature in three ways. First, it provides a rational ex-
planation for the empirical observation that IPO prices fail to fully adjust for publicly available
information. This follows from an increased investor demand for IPO allocations|and a higher
likelihood that the issue is underpriced|when public information is favorable. Second, it oers a
novel test of the incentive mechanism proposed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989). In particular,
our model predicts that investors' incentives to truthfully reveal private information during the
bookbuilding period are weaker in bear markets than in bull markets. Third, using a sample of
5,000 IPOs from 1981-2008, we show that both empirical implications are borne out in the data.
In our model, public information aects the distribution in investors' demand for allocations.
The issuer optimally underprices the IPO only when the demand for issuer stock is suciently
high, i.e., when a large number of investors get positive private signals. Since the private signals
and the public signal are positively unconditionally correlated, it is a higher likelihood of sucient
investor demand to induce underpricing when the public information is positive. We refer to this
mechanism as the demand eect.
The underwriter's optimal rule for the allocation of shares in the IPO favors investors who report
a positive private signal.5 An investor with positive private information can deate the IPO price
by falsely reporting a negative signal, but at the same time risk being left without any allocation
at all. Since the probability of being awarded underpriced shares after falsely reporting a negative
signal is higher when the public signal is negative, investors' incentives to lie are also stronger.
Thus, in order to induce truthful revelation of favorable private information, the underwriter must
compensate investors by underpricing the issue more when the public information is bad. We label
this mechanism the incentive eect.
The relative strength of the two eects determines how public information ultimately is related
4In contrast to Sherman (2005), there is no role for information costs in our model. Instead, the partial adjustment
is directly related to information revelation incentives.
5Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) nd that investors submitting limit order (price specic) bids bet greater
allocation, while Jenkinson and Jones (2004) report that nal oer prices are closely related to the limit order bids
in the order book.
2to underpricing. While the incentive eect predicts a negative relation between public information
and underpricing, the demand eect pulls in the opposite direction and predicts a positive relation.
Whenever the demand eect dominates the incentive eect, underpricing is positively related to
public information and the oer price partially adjusts for market-wide returns. This is the case
when the number of investors in the issue is suciently large.
We test the empirical implications of the model for a sample of 5,093 U.S. IPOs in the period
1981-2008. As a proxy for private information, we use the residual from a regression of the oer
price revision at the end of the registration period on the S&P500 index, eectively purging any
eect of market-wide returns from the price revision. The predictions of the model are all borne
out in the data. Importantly, for a given increase in private information, the rst-day returns
increase more in downmarkets than in upmarkets, consistent with the incentive eect. This eect
is concentrated to issues where demand for the shares oered in the IPO is high. Moreover, the
probability of positive rst-day returns is higher when public markets are doing well, consistent
with the demand eect.
Our paper oers a novel indirect test of the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argument. A direct
test of their argument requires that actual share allocations are related to investors' indications of
interest. However, such tests require proprietary data, which is not easily available.6 An alternative
is to show that greater upward revisions in the oer price during the subscription period give higher
underpricing, as rst done by Hanley (1993).7 We extend this approach by examining how public
information aects investors' incentives to reveal private information, as implied by the incentive
eect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The relation
between public information and underpricing is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we report
the result from our empirical tests of the model. Section 5 summarizes. All proofs are found in
Appendix A.
6Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) examine proprietary bid and allocation data
from two separate U.K. investment banks. Bubna and Prabhala (2010) use similar data from Indian IPOs. Three of
these four studies nd support for the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model.
7 Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) estimate a structural model of IPO allocations and nd greater institutional
allocation to be associated with larger price revisions, consistent with information production.
32 The model
We start with a rm that is about to oer its shares to outside investors through an IPO. The rm's
V value is good G = 1 with probability  and bad B = 0 with probability 1   . For simplicity,
the number of shares to be oated is normalized to one, and investors are allocated fractions of this
share. All agents are risk neutral, and the risk-free interest rate is zero.
There are N  2 investors participating in the oering. Each investor i = 1;:::;N observes at
a zero cost a private signal si = fgi;big, where gi represents positive information about the rm
and bi negative information. We may think of these investors as constituting the underwriter's
pool of regular investors, and the information signal si as their unique knowledge about the rm,
as well as information about their own demand and liquidity.8 Let n 2 [0;N] denote the number
of investors who observe positive private signals. The precision in the private signal si is the same
across all investors and equals  = q(gijG) = q(bijB) > 1=2, where q(j) and q() denote conditional
and unconditional probabilities throughout. The symmetry assumption that q(gIjG) = q(bIjB) is
made to simplify the exposition. The assumption that  > 1=2 means that the signal is informative
about the true value of the rm and hence that q(GjgI) > q(G) > q(GjbI).
In addition, all investors observe a common public signal s = fg;bg, where s = g represents
positive information and s = b negative information. The precision in the public signal is given
by  = q(gjG) = q(bjB), where  > 1=2: We can think of the public signal as market-wide
information|such as changes in aggregate demand or the business cycle|that aects the value of
the rm. Empirically, we use the market-wide stock returns observed prior to the IPO as a proxy
for the public signal.
We assume that signals are informative in the sense that a signal is more likely to be positive if
the true value of the rm is high, that is, q(gijG) > 1=2 and q(gjG) > 1=2. Similarly, if the value of
the rm is low, a signal is more likely to be negative, so that q(bijB) > 1=2 and q(bjB) > 1=2. In
addition, we assume that signals are unconditionally correlated in the sense that q(si;s) 6= q(si)q(s),
and conditionally uncorrelated so that q(gi;gjG) = q(gijG)q(gjG) and q(gi;gjB) = q(gijB)q(gjB).
8Alternatively, we may assume that investors' private signals are costly and that the underwriter is able to distin-
guish informed from uninformed investors, and will allow only informed investors to participate in the bookbuilding
process. If now the underwriter is unable to commit to compensate investors for their informational costs, then the
number N of investors in the oering will be determined endogenously from investors' incentive constraint and the
pricing of the issue will be as under our zero-cost assumption.
4These informational assumptions are standard.9 By Bayes' rule, they imply the following:
Lemma 1 The probability that an investor's private signal si is positive (negative) is higher if the
public signal s is positive (negative) than if the public signal is negative (positive); in other words,
q(gijg) > q(bijg) and q(bijb) > q(bijg).
The positive unconditional correlation between the public signal and investors' private signals
implied by Lemma 1 follows directly from the assumption that signals are informative about the
same underlying value.10 It is a key driver of both the incentive eect and the demand eect.
Intuitively, this assumption implies that the distribution of investors' private signal will depend on
the realization of the public signal.
Let v(n;s) denote the (true) aftermarket value of the rm, i.e., the value of the rm after it is
publicly listed. The aftermarket value of the rm is assumed to fully reect all available information
at the time of the oering. That is, the function v(n;s) is the expected value of the rm conditional
on the n positive private signals observed by investors and the public signal s: The specication
of v(n;s) as a conditional expectation implies that the marginal impact of each investor's private
signal on the rm's aftermarket value is decreasing in the number of investors in the oering (N).
This is in contrast to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), who specically assume that the aftermarket
value is additive in investors' private signals and hence that each private signal \has an equal
(absolute) marginal impact on the stock's value" (p. 347).
Because the aftermarket value of the rm increases in the number of positive private signals n,
n is also a measure of the demand for shares in the issue, and where a higher value of n corresponds
to higher demand. Indeed, the case for which n = N, and hence all investors observe positive
private signals, is referred to as the high-demand state. In contrast, the case for which n = 0 and
all investors observe negative private signals, is called the low-demand state.
The bookbuilding process is conducted as follows. Investors observe their private signals along
with the public signal. Bids are submitted to the underwriter eectively by reporting the private
9Using the normal distribution as a reference point, our informational assumptions are akin to having the true
value of the rm V be normally distributed with some mean  V and variance 
2
V , and letting each investor i observing
a signal si = V + i; where i has a zero mean, cov(i;j) = 0 for i 6= j (i.e., signals are conditionally uncorrelated),
and cov(si;sj) = 
2
V > 0 (i.e., signals are unconditionally correlated). Similarly, for a public signal s = V +p, it will
be the case that cov(i;p) = 0; and cov(si;s) = 
2
V .
10A corresponding result in the case of the normal distribution is that the expectation of si conditional on s is
increasing in s.
5signal. Each investor submits a \high" or a \low" bid, which is to say that she reports either
a positive or negative signal. In equilibrium, an investor who observes a positive private signal
reports this truthfully by bidding high. Similarly, an investor with a negative signal reports this
truthfully by submitting a low bid.
The rm pays no fees for the services of the underwriter. Before investors submit their bids,
the underwriter states his pricing and allocation policy. He then responds to investors' bids ac-
cording to this pre-committed policy, which maximizes the proceeds to the issuer. In equilibrium,
the underwriter receives all the relevant information from investors about the rm. Thus, when
determining the oer price, he correctly anticipates the rm's aftermarket value v(n;s).
Let p(n;s) denote the IPO price if n investors report positive private signals (si = gi) and
given the public signal s.11 Let z(gi;n) denote the fraction of the issue allocated to an investor
who submits a high bid, and z(bi;n) denote the fraction awarded to an investor submitting a low
bid. Since all private signals have the same precision, investors with identical bids receive equal
allocations. In other words, the issue is allocated pro-rata among investors who submit identical
bids. We assume, as do Benveniste and Spindt (1989), that the issuer is committed to price the rm
at or below its aftermarket value, so that p(n;s)  v(n;s). Unlike Benveniste and Spindt (1989),
however, we place no restrictions on the number of shares that can be allocated to one investor.12
This implies that the entire issue may be allocated to one investor. As discussed below, as long as
at least one investor observes a positive private signal si = gi, it is optimal to allocate the issue
exclusively to investors with favorable information. One implication of this is that an investor who
submits a low bid will receive an allocation only if the remaining 1   N investors submit low bids
as well.
Let us now consider investors' incentives to truthfully reveal their private signals. Trivially, an
investor with negative information has little incentive to misrepresent her signal. If she lies and
submits a high bid, she is awarded a fraction of the issue at a price exceeding the aftermarket value
of the rm implied by her private signal. Thus, she is better o truthfully submitting a low bid,
and possibly be allocated a share of the IPO at a price correctly reecting her negative signal.
Instead, we need to worry about the incentives of investors with positive private signals. These
11Since in our model the number of shares is one, the oer price is equal to the proceeds in the IPO.
12In a more general version of the model in Appendix B, we incorporate allocation restrictions.
6investors may benet from misrepresenting their private information, pretending to posses a nega-
tive signal in order to lower the issue price. The potential drawback of such a strategy is, however,
that other investors may submit high bids, leaving the untruthful investor without any allocation
in the oering.
For an investor i with a positive private signal, the expected payo from submitting a high bid




q(njs)z(gI;n)[v(n;s)   p(n;s)]; (1)
where q(njs) is the probability that a total of n investors receive positive private signals conditional
on investor i observing the private signal si = gi and the public signal s. Recall that z(gi;n)
is the fraction of the issue allocated to investor i for a given n if she submits a high bid. The
expected payo to investor i is thus her fraction of the IPO initial returns, probability-weighted
across dierent n.
The expected payo to the same investor from misrepresenting her information by submitting




q(njs)z(bI;n)[v(n;s)   p(n   1;s)]: (2)
For a given n and s, the oer price is now lower, p(n 1;s) < p(n;s), and the probability of receiving
an allocation in the IPO is now z(b;n) < z(g;n). That is, by submitting a low bid, the investor
would get a higher return for a given allocation, but at the same time risks getting a smaller (or
no) fraction of the issue.
The payo ^ U is the minimum rent for an investor with a positive private signal and hence
represents this investor's reservation value.13 To induce this investor to truthfully reveal her signal,
the expected payo U from bidding high must equal or exceed the expected prots ^ U from submit-
ting a low bid. The issue must thus be priced and allocated to satisfy the truth-telling (incentive)
constraint U  ^ U.
13As discussed above, investors with negative private information earn zero informational rents in equilibrium.





Formally, the objective of the underwriter (rm) is to maximize E with respect to allocations
z(si;n) and prices p(n;s) subject to the incentive constraint U  ^ U. Since issuance costs are exclu-
sively determined by investors' informational rents ^ U, maximizing E is equivalent to minimizing
^ U. The underwriter will further price and allocate the issue such that the investor's truth-telling
constraint is satised as an equality, U = ^ U.
The absence of allocation restrictions allows the underwriter to allocate shares only to investors
who submit high bids (i.e., report positive private information), regardless of the number of investors
submitting high bids. In equilibrium, this allocation rule sets z(bi;n) = 0 for all n > 0. That is,
investors reporting a negative signal get a zero allocation as long as at least one investor reports
a positive signal. This in turn minimizes the gains ^ U from lying and thus maximizes the IPO
proceeds E. In the event that all investors obtain negative signals (n = 0), and in equilibrium
submit low bids, the issue is allocated pro-rata among the N investors. In other words, the issue
is never withdrawn in the low-demand state.14
The given allocation rule implies that an investor who submits a low bid receives no shares
unless the remaining N   1 investors also submit low bids, in which case each investor is allocated
a fraction 1=N of the issue. The underwriter further reduces ^ U (and hence increases E) by not
underpricing the issue in the low-demand state; i.e., by setting p(0;s) = v(0;s). The expected
payo to an investor with a positive private signal from submitting a low bid now is
^ U = q(1js)
1
N
[v(1;s)   v(0;s)]; (4)
which is strictly positive since v(1;s) > v(0;s).
The expected payo to an investor with a positive private signal from truthfully revealing his
14Busaba (2006) shows that it may be optimal to commit to withdraw the issue with a positive probability if
demand is low. Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001) nd empirically that such a threat reduces underpricing. In our
setting, however, it is never optimal to withdraw the issue.







[v(n;s)   p(n;s)]: (5)
The set of prices p(n;s); n = 1;:::;N that satises the investor's incentive constraint U = ^ U is
indeterminate, since there are N prices to be determined from only one constraint. For tractability
(and without loss of generality), let the issue be fairly priced (no underpricing), so that p(n;s) =
v(n;s) for each n = 1;:::;N   1. Now the oer price in the high-state, p(N;s), is uniquely
determined from U = ^ U. With ^ U > 0, it follows that U > 0, which requires that p(N;s) < v(N;s).
That is, the issue is underpriced in the high-demand state where all investors observe positive
private signals.15
Since the issue price is set to the rm's aftermarket value v(n;s) in all states where n < N, the
payo in these states are zero (U = 0jn < N). The expected payo to an investor with a positive
signal of submitting a high bid therefore collapses to the expected payo in the high-demand state




[v(N;s)   p(N;s)]: (6)
The oer price p(N;s) in the high-demand state is determined from the investor's incentive con-
straint U = ^ U; which gives
p(N;s) = v(N;s)  
q(1js)
q(Njs)
[v(1;s)   v(0;s)]: (7)
Since v(1;s) > v(0;s); the issue is at all times underpriced in the high-demand state, i.e., p(N;s) <
v(N;s). In other words, the issue is underpriced as the underwriter is only partially adjusting the
oer price to the information learned by investors during the bookbuilding process.





15In Appendix B, we present a more general model with allocation restrictions in which the indeterminacy of prices
for high realizations of n is resolved by having the IPO be underpriced in expectation across high-demand states.
Numerical simulations show that the more general model with allocation restrictions yields identical insights and
empirical implications as the simpler model analyzed in the text.
9The probability of an upward revision is q(Njs), and hence the expected initial return equals
Er(s) = q(Njs)r(N;s); (9)
which measures the expected underpricing of the issue.
The analysis so far has established that IPOs are expected to be underpriced in order to induce
truthful revelation of positive private information, similar to Benveniste and Spindt (1989). In
the next section, we go beyond this standard argument and examine the relation between public
information and underpricing.
3 Public information and underpricing
As shown in Equation (9) above, the expected IPO initial return, Er(s); is the product of the initial
return in the high-demand state, r(N;s); and the probability that this state occurs, q(Njs): A key
contribution of this paper is the insight that the public signal aects the expected initial return
through both r(N;s) (the incentive eect) and q(Njs) (the demand eect), as discussed next.
Proposition 1 (The incentive eect) The initial return in the high-demand state is negatively
related to the public signal s, so that r(N;g) < r(N;b).
The public signal aects the initial return in the high-demand state by aecting the incentives
of investors to truthfully reveal their positive signals. Intuitively, the likelihood of being allocated
shares in the IPO for an investor with positive private information who falsely submit a low bid
is higher when the public signal is negative than when it is positive. The reason is that such an
investor is successful in getting allocated underpriced shares only when all the other investors report
negative signals as well. Since the probability of this event is negatively correlated with the public
signal, q(1jb) > q(1jg), the expected gains from lying are negatively related to the public signal.16
Thus, investors' incentives to hide favorable private information are negatively correlated with the
public signal. As a result, the amount of underpricing required by investors to truthfully reveal
16Formally, r(N;g) < r(N;b) requires that q(1jb)=q(0jb) < q(1jg)=q(0jg). This inequality holds if the private and
public signals are informative, which further imply that q(0jb) > q(0jg) and q(1jb)  q(1jg), for any N  2. This
follows as a consequence of Lemma 1.
10their positive signals is lower when the public outlook is good. This mechanism is the incentive
eect.
In addition to aecting investors' incentives, the public signal also impacts the probability
q(Njs) that there is sucient demand n for the issue to be underpriced in the rst place. This is
the demand eect:
Proposition 2 (The demand eect) The probability of the high-demand state, and hence the
probability that the IPO is underpriced, is positively related to the public signal, i.e., q(Njg) >
q(Njb).
Specically, positive public information increases the probability that investors obtain favorable
private signals and hence submit high bids. Obviously, a higher probability of investors having
favorable private information increases the likelihood that the issue is underpriced in the rst
place. Thus, through the demand eect, the probability that an issue is underpriced is positively
related to the public signal.
The incentive eect and the demand eect have opposite implications for the relationship be-
tween public information and underpricing. Our model therefore allows expected initial returns
to be positively or negatively related to the public signal, depending on which of the two eects
that dominates. The next proposition shows that as long as the number of investors in the issue is
suciently large the demand eect will dominate to create a positive relation consistent with the
evidence of partial adjustment to public information.
Proposition 3 Whenever the number of investors in the issue, N, is suciently large, the demand
eect strictly dominates the incentive eect. In this case, initial returns are positively related to
public information.
As the number of investors in the issue increases, the marginal impact of each investor's signal on
the aftermarket value of the rm declines. This reduces the potential payo, v(1;s) v(0;s), to the
investor of hiding her positive private signal, lowering the amount of underpricing required to induce
truthful revelation. In other words, an increase in the number of investors decreases the relative
importance of the incentive eect. Once the demand eect strictly dominates, the public signal will
be positively related to underpricing. Indeed, Proposition 3 predicts a positive relation between
11public information and initial returns|consistent with partial adjustment to public information|
whenever the number of investors in the issue is suciently large.
The result that the incentive eect weakens with the number of investors N stems from our
assumption that the aftermarket value of the rm represents the expected value of the rm condi-
tional on investors' private signals and the public signal. This in turn ensures that the marginal
impact on rm value of each investor's signal declines in N. The result is consistent with standard
micro structure models where investors' private information is reected in the stock's price through
the trading process.17 It does not arise in the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) setup where each
investor's signal is assumed to have an equal marginal impact on the aftermarket value irrespective
of the number of informed investors in the IPO. Formal proofs of our propositions can be found in
Appendix A.
Overall, our model provides a rational explanation for the empirical fact that oer prices adjust
only partially to pre-issue market returns. We propose that this partial adjustment is a result
of favorable private information and a resulting high demand for shares in the issue. We further
identify a counteracting incentive eect, which produces a negative relationship between public
information and underpricing. As long as investor demand in the IPO is suciently high, the
demand eect will dominate, resulting in a positive correlation between initial returns and market
returns.
Table 1 summarizes how the incentive and demand eects play out for dierent information sets.
When private information is negative (low-demand state), there is little need for the underwriter to
underprice the issue. In contrast, when investors have positive private information, their expected
gains from lying are positive, and higher in bad times than in good times. As a result, conditional
on a high-demand state, the level of underpricing will be higher when public information is negative
rather than positive. Table 1 further shows that, conditional on negative public information, the
probability is higher of investors receiving a negative (versus positive) private signal, and vice
versa for positive public information. Since the model predicts underpricing only when private
information is favorable, this implies that the probability of an issue being underpriced is higher
when the public signal is positive. Comparing the likelihood and magnitude of underpricing across
17See, e.g., Kyle (1985). In Chen and Wilhelm (2008) a similar eect in the IPO aftermarket leads early stage
investors to bid aggressively as they expect their information to become less important as new informed investors
enters the market.
12the dierent information sets will allow us to empirically test the model.
The incentive and demand eects have several empirical implications that are relatively straight-
forward to test. For example, the demand eect implies that the fraction of underpriced IPOs will
be higher when issued in upmarkets than when issued in downmarkets.18 Moreover, the incentive
eect implies less underpricing in good markets than in bad markets. Thus, initial returns should
be more sensitive to private information in IPOs preceded by negative rather than positive market
returns. We now turn to an empirical examination of the implications of the model.
4 Empirical tests of the model
4.1 Sample selection and description
We identify 8,498 U.S. IPOs in the period 1970-2008 from the Global New Issues databases in
Thompson Financial's SDC. Since the model analyzes the bookbuilding process, we restrict the
sample to 6,301 cases with a positive pricing range, i.e., with a positive spread between the high
and low ling price. Because SDC does not report a ling range prior to 1981, this restriction
eectively eliminates all IPOs in the 1970s.
We require rms to have a ling midpoint of at least $5 per share, to be listed in CRSP,
and to be traded by the 40th trading day after the public listing on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.
All unit oerings, real estate investment trusts (REITs), American Depository Receipts (ADRs),
and closed-end funds are eliminated. We further require the IPO rm to have a founding year in
the Field-Ritter founding dataset and a lead underwriter rank in the Ritter underwriter ranking
dataset.19 Our nal dataset consists of 5,093 IPOs in 1981-2008, all of which have a complete set
of control variables.
Table 2 reports the number of cases, and the average rst-day return and market return by year.
Two-thirds of the sample rms go public in the 1990s, one quarter in the 2000s and one tenth in
the 1980s. Column 3 shows the rst-day return IR1 = p1=p0 1, where p1 is the rm's closing price
on the rst day of trading and p0 is the nal oer price. To curb extreme outliers, we winsorize
IR1 at 200%. All stock price data is from CRSP. If there is no trade on a given day, we use the
18A substantial fraction of IPOs are overpriced. See, e.g., Ruud (1993) and more recently Lowry, Ocer, and
Schwert (2010).
19We thank Jay Ritter for making this data available on his webpage at the University of Florida.
13midpoint of the bid-ask spread. The average one-day return is 19% and varies substantially over
time. The largest underpricing takes place in years 1999 and 2000, with a mean rst-day return of
63% and 54%, respectively. In contrast, the average IR1 never exceeds 6% in any one year during
the 1984-1989 period. In the empirical analysis below, we use the rst-day return (IR1) as a proxy
for the underpricing of the oering.
The next three columns of Table 2 show the return on the S&P500 index over the 45 trading
days preceding the IPO issue date (SP500), and the proportion of IPOs that take place in positive
(SP500 > 0) and negative (SP500  0) market conditions, respectively. The average pre-issue
market return is 2.7% and three-quarters of the sample IPOs take place in bull markets. Inter-
estingly, also in the bubble period (1998-2000), a fair proportion of the IPOs (21%-42% per year)
take place in a downmarket. In the following, we use the S&P500 45-day return as a proxy for
the public information that reaches investors during the bookbuilding period. We choose a 45-day
window to match the number of trading days in the registration period for a typical IPO in our
data. The last column of Table 2 presents the proportion of IPOs with a negative rst-day return.
We report this for completeness as our model assumes that the oer price is set at or below the
rm's \true" value. This, of course, cannot hold ex-post for each case in the realized distribution.
4.2 Univariate analysis
In the model, the expected underpricing depends on the relative size of the two counteracting
eects of public information on investors' incentives and their demand for allocations. On the one
hand, when public information is negative, underwriters must underprice the issue more in order
to induce investors to reveal their positive private information (the incentive eect). On the other
hand, since public and private signals are unconditionally correlated, the demand for shares in
the IPO|and thus the likelihood that the issue is underpriced|is lower when publicly available
information is negative (the demand eect). These two eects have several empirical implications.
First, for a given set of private information we should observe more underpricing in downmarkets
than in upmarkets. Second, when public information is positive, investors are more likely to also
have favorable private information and the proportion underpriced oerings should be higher. In
the following, we perform dierent tests of these predictions. We start by examining the univariate
dierences in underpricing across various information sets.
14Testing the model requires a measure for private information. Since private information in itself
is unobservable, we follow Hanley (1993) and turn to the outcome of the bookbuilding process. As
discussed above, the objective of this process is to uncover investors' private information. Any
revision in the nal oer price from the indicated price in the initial ling range will|at least
partly|reect new information revealed by investors to the underwriter during the road show. We
dene the price revision as PU = p0=pmid   1, where pmid is the ling range midpoint. Using PU
as a proxy for private information assumes that all information captured by the price revision is
private, also if it overlaps with concurrent public information.
Table 3 reports the average initial return (IR1) split by positive (SP500 > 0) and negative
(SP500  0) public information, respectively. Variable denitions and data sources are shown in
Table 4. In Panel A of Table 3, the sample is further split by the sign of the price revision (positive,
zero, and negative). Interestingly, the univariate results for dierent information sets are consistent
with the empirical patterns predicted by the model. When private information is dismal (PU < 0),
the average level of underpricing is relatively small, with initial returns of 5% in upmarkets and 4%
in downmarkets. Consistent with Benveniste and Spindt (1989), the level of underpricing is much
higher when private information is good (PU > 0). Unique to our model predictions, however, the
average underpricing conditional on positive private information is particularly high when the issue
takes place in a downmarket (IR1 = 42%) compared to an upmarket (IR1 = 35%). Also, when
public information is positive (SP500 > 0), a higher fraction of the issues involve positive rather
than negative private information (48% vs. 40%), while the opposite holds when public markets
are down (33% IPOs with positive vs. 55% IPOs with negative private information).
As pointed out above, the nal revision of the oer price (PU) accounts for broadly available
information that reaches the market during the registration period. To isolate information that
is truly private, we compute a measure for investors' private information, Private, that purges
the content of market-wide information from the oer price revision. Specically, Private is the
residual from the regression PU =   SP500 + . In other words, Private is any information in
the price revision above and beyond what can easily be inferred from the public markets. It is the
result of the extreme view that only information in the price revision that cannot be attributed to
the public signal is considered private.20
20Although the price revision has been shown to vary with other oer characteristics (e.g. stock exchange, total
15Price updates, however, are discrete and done in tick size increments.21 Thus, also when PU is
correctly adjusted for the SP500 and there is no private information in the update, it is unlikely that
 exactly equals zero. Thus, for 286 cases where jj < 1% of the mid-range price, we set Private
to zero.22 Panel B of table 3 shows the average rst-day return split by the sign of Private.
Interestingly, this split generates initial return averages that closely map the ones reported for PU
in Panel A.
As in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), our model predicts underpricing only when investor demand
is high. As a coarse measure for investor demand, we dene three dummy variables that indicate
whether or not the nal oer price is set outside the initial ling range. The high-demand state
(HDS) represents IPOs where the oer price is on or above the upper bound of the ling range.
Similarly, the low-demand state (LDS) indicates bookbuilding processes that yield an oer price on
or below the lower bound of the ling range. Finally, the medium-demand state (MDS) indicates
that the nal oer price is within the initial ling range.
Panel C of Table 3 shows the average rst-day returns across the three demand states. A
similar pattern as for PU and Private emerges. Again, the average rst-day return is marginal
(4%-5%) in the low-demand state, and higher in the high-demand state when the S&P500 return
is negative (48%) vs. positive (38%). Also, most oerings (48%) are in LDS when markets are
down, while most oerings (42%) are in HDS when markets are up. Overall, the predictions of the
model appear to hold in the univariate across our dierent proxies for private information and high
investor demand. We next test if the incentive and demand eects also hold in the cross-section.
4.3 Tests of the incentive eect
When the private signal is negative, investors have little incentive to hide their information. In
contrast, in order to persuade investors to reveal positive private information, underwriters have
to underprice the oering. A novel and central prediction of our model is that investors require
more underpricing to reveal their private signal in downmarkets than in upmarkets. We test this
prediction by regressing the initial return (IR1) on our proxy for private information (Private),
proceeds raised, underwriter rank, etc.), these characteristics are known already at the beginning of the bookbuilding
process and therefore do not represent new information in our setting.
21Stocks are traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ in price increments of $1/8 or $1/16, referred to as tick sizes.
22With an average mid-range price of $14 in our sample, 1% corresponds roughly to one tick size. Virtually none
of the price updates (PU) are smaller than 1%.
16split by dierent public information sets. The rst regression specication is:
IR1 =  + 1 Private  SP500POS + 2Private  SP500NEG + 3SP500POS + e: (10)
SP500POS and SP500NEG are two mutually exclusive dummy variables. The variable SP500POS
takes the value of one if the 45-day pre-issue market return is positive (SP500 > 0) and SP500NEG =
1 if SP500  0. The interaction variables Private  SP500POS and Private  SP500NEG hence
capture the eect of private information on underpricing when public information is positive and
negative, respectively. Our model predicts that 1 < 2. We further include the dummy SP500POS
separately to allow for the two interaction variables to have dierent intercepts.
The second regression specication is:
IR1 =  + 1Private + 2Private  SP500POS + 3SP500POS + u: (11)
This equation provides a direct test of whether the two coecients 1 and 2 are dierent from
each other. Specically, the coecient 2 for Private  SP500POS is such that 2 = 1   2, and
we predict 2 < 0.23
The coecient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations are shown in Table 5.
The t-statistics reported in parenthesis use standard errors clustered on listing month and Fama-
French 49 industry. The rst regression simply veries that extant ndings of partial adjustment
to private and public information also hold in our sample. As shown in column (1), the coecient
on Private is positive and highly signicant (p-value <0.001). That is, the nal oer price is only
partially adjusted for private information revealed during the bookbuilding process, consistent with
the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model. Moreover, by including both SP500 and SP500POS,
we allow the partial adjustment to be asymmetric with respect to positive and negative public
information. The coecient for SP500 is positive and signicant, consistent with the standard
result of partial adjustment to public information. The coecient for SP500POS is marginal and
23To see why, note that equation (11) can be rewritten as
IR1 =  + 1Private  (SP500POS + SP500NEG) + 2Private  SP500POS + 3SP500POS + u; or
IR1 =  + (1 + 2)Private  SP500POS + 1Private  SP500NEG + 3SP500POS + u:
Compare this with equation (10) and it is obvious that 1 + 2 = 1 and 1 = 2, such that 2 = 1   2.
17of a much smaller magnitude, indicating that the eect of public information on initial returns is
largely symmetric.
The next two regressions use the specications presented in equations (10) and (11), respectively.
As shown in columns (2) and (3), the coecients for PrivateSP500POS and PrivateSP500NEG
are 1 = 0:89 and 2 = 1:08, respectively, both highly signicant from zero. Moreover, the dierence
between the two coecients, 2, is negative with a p-value < 0:05.24 This suggests that investors
require more underpricing in downmarkets than in upmarkets to reveal a given set of private
information, as predicted by the model.
The last three columns of table 5 add other characteristics of the oering that have previously
been shown to aect IPO initial returns. These control variables include the logarithm of the
number of years since the rm was founded (Age), the percentage of the shares sold that are
newly issued (Primary), the logarithm of the total $ proceeds raised in the IPO (Proceeds), the
logarithm of the total number of shares sold in the issue (Shares), and the average rank of the
lead underwriter (Rank). Underwriters are ranked on a scale from 0 to 9, where a higher number
imply higher underwriter quality. We further add dummy variables indicating that the rm is in a
high-tech industry (HighTech), is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NY SE) or NASDAQ
(NASDAQ), and that the IPO takes place in the period 9/1998-8/2000 (Bubble), respectively.
Finally, since high-technology rms were in particularly high demand during the bubble period, we
also add an interaction variable Bubble  HighTech.
Many of the control variables produce signicant coecients. The initial returns are decreasing
in rm age and the $ proceeds raised in the IPO, and increasing in the percent newly issued
shares, the number of shares oered and the average rank of the lead underwriter. Moreover, rst-
day returns tend to be higher for high-tech rms and oerings during the bubble period, and in
particular for high-tech rms listed in the 1999-2000 period. Importantly, the empirical predictions
of our model also hold when the regressions include the control variables. As reported in columns
(5) and (6), the coecients 1 = 0:78 and 2 = 0:92 are both positive and highly signicant. Also,
1 < 2, with the dierence being signicantly dierent from zero at the 5%-level. In sum, our
regressions support the existence of the incentive eect.
24The table shows a two-sided t-test of the dierence, while the model in fact only requires a one-sided t-test of
the dierence, eectively doubling the signicance of the test.
18For robustness, we run the same OLS regressions instead using the price update PU as a proxy
for private information. The regression results are reported in Table 6. The standard errors are
clustered on listing month and Fama-French 49 industry, and shown in parenthesis. Importantly,
the results are similar to the ones reported above for Private. The coecients for PU SP500POS
and PU  SP500NEG are 1 = 0:90 and 2 = 1:07, respectively, and signicantly dierent at the
5%-level (columns 2 and 3). The inferences for PU hold when adding all our control variables
(columns 4-6), which produce coecients similar to those reported above. However, because PU
is positively correlated to SP500, the latter variable receives an insignicant coecient in Table 6.
One implication of the model is that underpricing is required only in the high-demand state|
and not in the low-demand state|in order to induce investors to truthfully reveal their private
information. As a further test of the incentive eect, we examine the impact of the interaction
variables PrivateSP500POS and PrivateSP00NEG on IR1 separately for the dierent demand
states: high, medium and low. The results from OLS regressions with the rst-day underpricing
as dependent variable are presented in Table 7. As before, the t-statistics (in parenthesis) use
standard errors clustered on Fama-French 49 industry and listing month. All regressions include
the full set of controls discussed above. While not shown in the table for expositional purposes, all
the control variables receive coecients of similar magnitude and signicance as in Table 5.
The rst column of Table 7 shows how the rst-day return varies across dierent demand states
and with private information. The initial return tends to be lowest in the low-demand state,
with a coecient for LDS of -0.06 and highest in the high-demand state, with a coecient for
HDS of 0.04, both signicant at the 0.1%-level. Moreover, the change in the rst-day return
for a given change in private information is highest in the high-demand state (the coecient for
Private  HDS is 1.03 and highly signicant); intermediate in the medium-demand state (the
coecient for Private  MDS is 0.53 with a p-value< 0:001); and insignicant from zero in the
low-demand state. Moreover, as shown in model (2), the three coecients are signicantly dierent
from each other (p < 0:001). This suggests that the compensation investors require for truthfully
disclosing their private information is highest in the high-demand state and close to zero in the
low-demand state, as predicted by the model.
The remaining two columns of Table 7 examine the coecient for Private conditional on positive
and negative public information, respectively, and across the low- and high-demand states. From
19models (3) and (4), the coecient for Private  HDS is signicantly smaller in upmarkets than
in downmarkets. That is, the coecients for Private  HDS  SP500POS and Private  HDS 
SP500NEG of 0.96 and 1.30, respectively, are signicantly dierent (p-value<0.01). In contrast,
the coecient for PrivateLDS is close to zero and insignicantly dierent across the two public
information sets.25 To sum up, these regressions indicate that the underpricing compensating
investors for the revelation of private information is largely related to the high-demand state and
not relevant for the low-demand state.
Overall, the regression results support the existence of the incentive eect as predicted by the
model. Investors' incentives to reveal their private information|and therefore the required level
of underpricing|depends on nature of the public information. Specically, investors require less
compensation to disclose favorable private signals when market-wide prospects are good than when
the general outlook is gloomy. Having empirically established the existence of the incentive eect in
the data, we now turn to tests of the eects of private and public information on investors' demand
for shares.
4.4 Tests of the demand eect
In general, investor demand for IPO allocations depends on their private information: the better
the private signal, the higher demand for shares in the IPO. In our model, the demand eect arises
from the positive unconditional correlation between public and private information, based on the
assumption that all of these signals are informative. Given positive public information, investors are
more likely to have positive private signals. As a result, investor demand and thus the proportion
underpriced IPOs is higher in bear markets. This is the implication of the demand eect that we
test empirically.
We rst test the eect of public information on the likelihood that the rst-day return is
positive. Table 8 reports the coecient estimates from probit regressions of the determinants of a
positive (versus nonpositive) rst-day return, IR1POS. As predicted by the model, the coecients
for SP500 and SP500POS are positive and signicant at the 0.1%-level. The higher the pre-issue
market return, the more likely is the rst-day stock return to be positive. When including SP500
25Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) nd that grey-market trading by individual investors on a forward
(when-issued) basis is informative for the aftermarket price only when demand is high (versus low).
20and SP500POS at the same time, reported in column 3, the dummy variable becomes largely
insignicant, suggesting that the eect is symmetric across positive and negative market returns.
That is, the likelihood of a positive rst-day return increases with the registration period market
returns, both in upmarkets and downmarkets.
While public information helps predict the occurrence of underpricing, the variable Private also
produces a positive and signicant coecient (p<0.001). That is, the more favorable the private
information, the more likely is the oer to have a positive rst-day return. This result is robust
across all six regression specications, also when including the standard controls (columns 4-6). As
shown in the table, the probability that the rst-day return is positive decreases with the size of
the oering (Proceeds) and is higher the more shares that are issued (Shares), and for rms listed
on NASDAQ and NYSE (versus AMEX).
We run the same set of regressions using PU as a proxy for information. The results are shown
in Table 9. Again, the proability of underpricing is higher the better the private information.
Controlling for PU, the coecients for SP500 and SP500POS are highly signicant, as predicted
by our model. When entering the two stock-market return variables at the same time, however, they
both become insignicant. It appears that the multicolinearity with PU eliminates the signicance
of SP500 in the presence of the upmarket dummy. The control variables produce similar coecients
as before, with the exception of NASDAQ, which now enters the regressions with a positive
coecient.
As a third test of the demand eect, we regress indicators for the high-demand state and low-
demand state, respectively, on the S&P500 return. Table 10 reports the coecients from probit
regressions estimating the probability that the IPO is in a high-demand state (columns 1-4) and
a low-demand state (columns 5-8), respectively. Recall that, in the model, all investors must have
positive private signals in order for the high-demand state to occur. Thus, the high-demand state
can be viewed as coarse|and therefore robust|proxy for issues with positive private information.
As shown in the table, the probability of pricing an issue above the ling range (HDS) is higher
in upmarkets and increases in the magnitude of the market return. As expected, the opposite results
are obtained when a dummy for the low-demand state (LDS) is the dependent variable. Here, the
probability for an issue to be priced below its ling range is lower in upmarkets and decreases with
the return on the market index during the registration period.
21Overall, the data supports the existence of both the incentive eect and the demand eect,
tested for separately. Our model is interesting because it provides a rational explanation for partial
adjustment of the oer price to public information. The novel mechanism is the incentive eect,
which ties the sign of public information to investors' incentives to reveal their positive private
signals. As predicted by the model, and played out in the data, investors receive more compensation
for positive private information in downmarkets than in upmarkets. Moreover, the counteracting
demand eect, implying a higher probability of positive private information and hence underpricing
in bull markets than in bear markets, also receives strong support by the data. Combined, these two
eects and the way public information aects investors' incentives to disclose private information
can explain the partial adjustment to public information that has been observed by many.
5 Summary
This paper presents a model that explains the relationship between public information and IPO
initial returns. Building on the framework of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), where investors are
compensated with underpriced shares for disclosing private information, we show that publicly
available information is related to IPO underpricing through two dierent mechanisms.
First, and unique to our model, market-wide information aects the underpricing required for
investors to reveal their positive private signal. When the public outlook is negative, the expected
prots from hiding favorable private information is higher. Accordingly, investors require a higher
compensation|in the form of more underpricing|to disclose good news when public information
is bad. This is the incentive eect.
Second, because public and private signals are informative, they are also unconditionally cor-
related. That is, the probability of receiving a good private signal given a positive market outlook
is higher than when the market outlook is poor. Consequently, investors are more likely to have
positive signals|which is necessary for the issue to be underpriced in the rst place|in upmarkets
than in downmarkets. As a result, the probability that an issue is underpriced is higher when public
information is positive. This is the demand eect.
Whether underpricing ultimately is positively or negatively related to public information de-
pends on which of the two eects dominates. If the number of investors in the oering is suciently
22large, the demand eect will dominate and initial IPO returns will be increasing in pre-issue market
returns. While not explicitly incorporated in the model, if the price investors require to disclose
their private information increases, the incentive eect will dominate and IPO returns will decrease
in market returns. Our model thus allows for the possibility of either under- or over adjustment to
public information in the oer price.
We test the predictions of the model for a sample of 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008. As a proxy
for private information, we use the residual from an OLS regression of the nal oer price revision
on the pre-issue market returns. This purges any eect of market-wide information from the price
revision, attributing the remaining change to investors' private signals.
In cross-sectional tests, we show that initial returns change more for a given change in private
information in downmarkets than in upmarkets. In other words, investors' private information is
more completely incorporated into the IPO price when pre-IPO market-wide returns are positive
rather than negative. This eect is particularly pronounced for issues that are priced above the
ling range and largely absent in issues that are priced below the ling range. This is consistent
with the incentive eect in our model, and provides indirect support for the incentive mechanism
proposed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
We further nd a positive correlation between the stock market index and the likelihood that
an issue has positive rst-day returns. Market-wide equity returns also increase the probability of
the high-demand state, i.e., when the issue ultimately is priced above its initial ling range. This
is all consistent with the demand aect.
Our model provides a rational explanation for partial adjustment in the oer price to public
information, as observed by many others. One potential extension is to explore the mechanisms that
determine the relative strengths of the demand and the incentive eect. Another extension is to
develop the model's predictions with respect to the volatility of initial returns, and understand how
return volatility is aected by market conditions. Both extensions could help us better understand
the larger mechanisms behind IPO pricing and allocations.
23A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.






q(gi;g) = q(gi;gjG)q(G) + q(gi;gjB)q(B)
= q(gijG)q(gjG)q(G) + q(gijB)q(gjB)q(B)
=  + (1   )(1   )(1   )
(13)
Similarly,
q(g) = q(gjG)q(G) + q(gjB)q(B) =  + (1   )(1   ) (14)
and hence
q(gIjg) =
 + (1   )(1   )(1   )
 + (1   )(1   )
(15)
It is then immediate that
q(gIjb) =
(1   ) + (1   )(1   )
(1   ) + (1   )
(16)
and furthermore that
q(gijg)   q(gijb) =
(1   )(2   1)(2   1))
[ + (1   )(1   ][(1   ) + (1   )]
> 0 (17)
since  > 1=2 and  > 1=2. It can similarly be shown that q(bIjb) > q(gIjb) if  > 1=2 and  > 1=2.
To setup the proofs to Propositions 1 - 3 we use the following probabilistic assumptions and Bayes'
rule.
24V = fG = 1;B = 0g
si = fgi;big
s = fg;bg
q(gi j G) = q(bi j B) =  > q(bi j G) = q(gi j B) = (1   ) (18)
q(g j G) = q(b j B) =  > q(b j G) = q(g j B) = (1   ) (19)
q(G) =  q(B) = (1   )
q(s) = q(sjG)q(G) + q(sjB)q(B)
q(G j g) =  =

 + (1   )(1   )
q(B j g) =   = (1   )
q(B j b) =  =
(1   )
(1   ) + (1   )
q(G j b) =   = (1   )
Assumptions (18) and (19) imply that the signals (sI;s) are informative, and hence
q(Gjg) > q(G)

 + (1   )(1   )
> 
 >  + (1   )(1   )
(2   1) > (2   1)
q(gjG) =  > 1=2
which holds for all  2 (0;1).
Further, the probability for n positive private signals (gI) given a good rm (G), and the probability
of n positive private signals given the public signal (s) is given by
25q(n j G)  Binomial[N;]
q(n j B)  Binomial[N;(1   )]
q(n j s) = q(n j G)q(G j s) + q(n j B)q(B j s)
Finally the expected aftermarket value, v(n;s), of the rm given the number of private signals, n,
and the public signal s,




Proof of Proposition 1.




  1;s 2 fb;gg; (20)
where
p(N;s) = v(N;s)  
q(1 j s)
q(N j s)
[v(1;s)   v(0;s)]: (21)









































q(1 j G)q(0 j g)   q(0 j G)q(1 j g)
q(1 j G)q(0 j b)   q(0 j G)q(1 j b)
(25)
Substituing Zs = 1
N
q(1js)
q(0js) inequality (25) simplies to
1 >
q(1 j G)   q(0 j G)NZg
q(1 j G)   q(0 j G)NZb
=
   (1   )Zg
   (1   )Zb
(26)












q(1 j G)q(G j g) + q(1 j B)q(B j g)
q(0 j G)q(G j g) + q(0 j B)q(B j g)
>
q(1 j G)q(G j b) + q(1 j B)q(B j b)
q(0 j G)q(G j b) + q(0 j B)q(B j b)
(1   )N 1 + N 1(1   ) 
(1   )N + N 
>
(1   )N 1  + N 1(1   )
(1   )N   + N
(27)
Dividing by N and substituting   =
1 
 we get
 N 1 +   
 N +  
>
 N 1  +  
 N   + 
 N +  2 
 N +  
>
 N   +  2
 N   + 
 N +  2  +      
 N +  
>
 N   +  2 +    
 N   + 
1  
(1    2) 
 N +  
> 1  
(1    2)
 N   + 
(1    2)
 N   + 
>
(1    2) 
 N +  
assuming   < 1, which implies  > 1=2, we have
[ N +  ] >  [ N   + ]
 N[     ] > 0 (28)
27As long as  N > 0, we have that
 >    = (1   )(1   )
 > 1       + 
 +  > 1 (29)







q(gjG)q(G)q(b) + q(bjB)q(B)q(g) > q(g)q(b)
q(gjG)q(G)q(b) + q(bjB)q(B)q(g) > [q(gjG)q(G) + q(gjB)q(B)]q(b)
q(bjB)q(B)q(g) > q(gjB)q(B)q(b)
q(bjB)q(g) > q(gjB)q(b)
[ + (1   )(1   )] > (1   )[(1   ) + (1   )]
2 > (1   )2
 > 1=2 (30)
Thus, for any ; > 1=2,  2 (0;1) and  N > 0 we have that r(N;g) < r(N;b).
Proof of Proposition 2.
By Bayes' rule it follows that
q(N j g) = q(N j G)q(G j g) + q(N j B)q(B j g) (31)
= N + (1   )N 
q(N j b) = q(N j G)q(G j b) + q(N j B)q(B j b) (32)
= N   + (1   )N
28Take the dierence to prove the proposition.
q(N j g) > q(N j b)












(    ) +  N(    ) > 0
( +    1)(1    N) > 0 (33)
Hence we see using the same reasoning as from (29) to (30) that q(N j g) > q(N j b) holds for any
 > 1=2,  2 (0;1) and  N < 1 (which holds if  > 1=2).
Proof of Proposition 3.












Assuming the signals are informative (; > 1=2) we have the following.











which completes the proof.
29B Appendix
Consider now a more general version of the model. In particular, assume that the underwriter
is constrained to allocate no more that a fraction  m < 1 of the issue to one investor. A central
implication of Benveniste and Spindt is that it is optimal to allocate as few shares as possible
to investors who report negative information, and hence as many shares as possible to investors
who report positive information. In the present setting, this optimal allocation rule implies that if
n m  1, then only investors who report positive information will be allocated shares, each receiving
a fraction 1=n of the issue. If n m < 1, then a fraction n m of the issue will be allocated to investors
who report positive information, each receiving a fraction 1= n. The remaining shares, 1   n m, are









the issue. This allocation policy implies a cut-o value for n, denoted  n, such that an investor who
reports negative information will be allocated shares only if n <  n = 1= m.
The underwriter prices the issue after collecting investors' bids, committing to price the issue
so that it is never overpriced in expectation. In particular, for the case n   n, the issuer sets a
price pH(s) in order to induce investors with positive private information to report this truthfully.
For the case n <  n, the underwriter sets a price pn(s) = v(n;s), which ensures that investors who
report negative information earn zero excess returns, in equilibrium.26 The pricing pH(s) for the
case n  ^ n may be interpreted as an upward revision in the oer price relative to the midpoint of
the initial range, and similarly the pricing for the case n < ^ n as a downward revision.
To nd pH(s), consider rst the expected payo to an investor with positive private information











q(njs;gI)(v(n + 1;s)   v(n;s)) (37)
26An alternative pricing strategy is to oer a xed price pL(s) that, in equilibrium, gives a zero expected return
to investors with low bids. It can be shown, however, that this alternative pricing strategy will yield strictly higher
incentives to submit low bids for investors with positive information, and hence it will yield higher underpricing. In
other words, this alternative pricing strategy is not optimal. Importantly, the main results are unaected by which







n+1(1   )N 1 n + (1   )n+1N 1 n(1   )(1   )








n+1(1   )N 1 n(1   ) + (1   )n+1N 1 n(1   )





n(1   )N n + (1   )nN n(1   )(1   )
(40)
and
v(n + 1;g) =
n(1   )N n
n(1   )N n + (1   )nN n(1   )(1   )
: (41)
The expression for ^ U(s) reects the assumption that the underwriter sets a price that fully impounds
the information contained in investors' bids whenever n < ^ n.
Next, we establish the oer price pH(s) that is needed to induce investors with positive private





q(njgI;s)(v(n + 1;s)   pH(s))  ^ U(s): (42)













q(njgI;s)v(n + 1;s)   ^ U
!
: (43)
The expected aftermarket value of the rm conditional on an upward revision in the oer price








The issue is underpriced if vH(s) > pH(s), which obtains whenever ^ U > 0.27 The initial return





1+n q(njs) and hence pH(s) < vH(s)
if (and only if) ^ U(s) > 0.










In other words, as in the simpler model in the text, the expected initial return Er(s) consists of
the probability
PN
n= n q(njs) of an upward revision in the oer price, and the initial return r(s)
conditional on this upward revision.
As before, partial adjustment to public information requires that
Er(g) > Er(b): (47)









It can be shown numerically that this more general version of the model behaves similarly to the
simpler model solved analytically in the text. In particular, the incentive eect and the demand
eect both hold (unequivocally), and the demand eect dominates the incentive eect to ensure
partial adjustment to public information whenever the number of investors is suciently large.
Finally, the intuition as well as the empirical implications of the eects remain unaltered.
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35Table 2: Sample return characteristics
The table shows the annual distribution of the sample of 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008, and the average rst-day
return and stock market return by year. The rst-day return is IR1 = p1=p0   1, where p1 is the closing price on
the rst trading day and p0 is the oer price, winsorized at 200%. The return on the S&P500 index (SP500) is
measured over the 45 trading days preceding the issue. Market conditions report the proportion of IPOs that take
place in a positive market (SP500 > 0) and negative market (SP500  0), respectively. The nal column reports
the proportion negative rst-day returns by year and in total.
Listing Sample First-day S&P500 Market conditions: Proportion
year size return return proportion proportion IR1 < 0
(N) (IR1) (SP500) positive negative
1981 4 3.9% -1.5% 50.0% 50.0% 25.0%
1982 1 4.7% 1.6% 100.0% 0.0%
1983 14 11.1% 2.5% 71.4% 400.0% 0.0%
1984 10 2.0% 1.9% 40.0% 42.9% 10.0%
1985 46 5.4% 4.0% 78.3% 100.0% 21.7%
1986 207 4.1% 2.6% 70.0% 134.8% 28.0%
1987 194 5.6% 6.3% 88.7% 10.6% 18.0%
1988 72 4.8% 2.0% 63.9% 13.4% 16.7%
1989 58 5.7% 4.4% 72.4% 22.2% 5.2%
1990 69 9.2% 0.3% 60.9% 46.6% 8.7%
1991 226 10.9% 1.4% 58.4% 136.2% 11.1%
1992 305 9.0% 2.1% 66.6% 45.1% 12.8%
1993 417 11.6% 1.4% 82.5% 23.9% 10.3%
1994 324 8.7% -0.6% 45.1% 42.7% 6.8%
1995 359 20.5% 5.1% 99.7% 0.3% 7.0%
1996 571 15.9% 4.1% 82.1% 28.4% 8.8%
1997 381 14.2% 5.3% 83.7% 10.9% 6.8%
1998 256 20.8% 5.4% 78.9% 14.2% 9.8%
1999 421 63.4% 2.5% 73.2% 44.1% 11.9%
2000 323 53.8% 0.2% 57.9% 32.3% 10.5%
2001 68 14.6% 0.2% 48.5% 10.8% 10.3%
2002 49 8.0% -3.8% 26.5% 52.9% 18.4%
2003 53 12.7% 4.1% 92.5% 8.2% 15.1%
2004 162 12.2% 1.7% 64.2% 109.4% 19.1%
2005 162 11.7% 1.2% 65.4% 34.6% 22.2%
2006 168 11.4% 2.5% 81.0% 19.8% 20.8%
2007 157 13.3% 2.0% 66.2% 31.5% 24.8%
2008 16 2.4% -3.3% 50.0% 5.1% 56.3%
Total 5,093 19.2% 2.7% 73.1% 26.9% 12.5%
36Table 3: First-day returns split by positive and negative information
The table shows the average rst-day return, split by positive and negative public information (SP500), respectively.
The rst-day return is IR1 = p1=p0   1, where p1 is the closing price on the rst trading day and p0 is the oer
price, winsorized at 200%. The table shows a further split by the sign of the nal revision of the oer price (PU,
Panel A), the price revision residual (Private, Panel B), and the demand state (HDS=MDS=LDS, Panel C). All
variables are dened in Table 4. The sample is 5,093 U.S. IPOs, 1981-2008.
Panel A: Price update (PU)
Public information: Positive (SP500 > 0) Negative (SP500  0)
Price update: Positive Zero Negative Positive Zero Negative
First-day return (IR1) 34.7% 11.0% 4.6% 42.4% 12.1% 3.5%
Number of cases, N 1788 448 1485 455 168 749
Percent of cases 48% 12% 40% 33% 12% 55%
Panel B: Price update residual (Private)
Public information: Positive (SP500 > 0) Negative (SP500  0)
Private information: Positive Zero Negative Positive Zero Negative
First-day return (IR1) 36.1% 11.0% 6.0% 37.8% 9.6% 3.5%
Number of cases, N 1681 188 1852 542 98 732
Percent of cases 45% 5% 50% 40% 7% 53%
Panel C: Demand state (HDS=MDS=LDS)
Public information: Positive (SP500 > 0) Negative (SP500  0)
Demand state: High Medium Low High Medium Low
First-day return (IR1) 37.9% 9.4% 4.5% 47.5% 9.0% 3.5%
Number of cases, N 1577 880 1264 396 320 656
Percent of cases 42% 24% 34% 29% 23% 48%
37Table 4: Variable denitions
The table shows names and denitions of, and sources for, the variables used in the analysis. Ken French and Jay
Ritter refer to their respective data webpages. p0 is the nal oer price, and pL and pH are the lower and upper
bound, respectively, of the ling range.
Name Denition Sources
A: Variables critical for testing the model
IR1 One-day initial return, dened as IR1 = p1=p0   1, where p1 is the rm's
closing price on the rst trading day, winsorized at 200%. Proxy for un-
derpricing.
SDC, CRSP
SP500 Return on the S&P500 index over the 45 trading days preceding the oer
(the book building period). Proxy for public information.
CRSP
PU Revision in the nal oer price from the initial ling range midpoint (price
update), dened as PU = p0=pmid   1, where pmid is the midpoint of the
ling range.
SDC
Private The residual () from the regression of the price update on the S&P500
return: PU =   SP500 + , and set to zero when jj < 1%. Proxy for
private information.
SDC, CRSP
POS, NEG The subscript POS and NEG indicate a dummy taking the value of one if
the variable is positive and non-positive, respectively.
HDS Dummy indicating that the nal oer price is above the initial ling range,
dened as p0  pH. Proxy for high demand state.
SDC
MDS Dummy indicating that the nal oer price is within the initial ling range,
dened as pL < p0 < pH. Proxy for medium demand state.
SDC
LDS Dummy indicating that the nal oer price is below the initial ling range,
dened as p0  pL. Proxy for low demand state.
SDC
B: Control variables
Age Log of rm age since the founding year. Jay Ritter
Primary Percentage of shares sold in the IPO that are newly issued (primary
shares).
SDC
Proceeds Log of total $ proceeds raised in the IPO. SDC
Shares Log of total number of shares sold in the IPO. SDC
Rank Average rank of the lead underwriter. Jay Ritter
HighTech Dummy indicating that the IPO rm is a high-technology rm. SDC
Bubble Dummy indicating that the IPO took place in the period 9/1998-8/2000. SDC
NASDAQ Dummy indicating that the IPO rm is listed on Nasdaq. CRSP




FF49id Fama-French 49 industries. Ken French
38Table 5: Tests of the incentive eect (I): rst-day returns
Tests of the incentive eect using OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the rst-day return (IR1).
All variables are dened in Table 4. The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use standard errors clustered on
Fama-French 49 industry and listing month. +, *, **, and *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.01% level, respectively. The sample is 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.






(20.96) (13.47) (21.78) (15.28)





(18.25) (-2.12) (18.98) (-2.17)










































































(17.60) (17.29) (17.29) (3.25) (3.28) (3.28)
Adjusted R
2 0.366 0.369 0.369 0.497 0.498 0.498
39Table 6: Tests of the incentive eect (II): rst-day returns
Tests of the incentive eect using OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the rst-day return (IR1).
All variables are dened in Table 4. The t-statistics (in parenthesis) use standard errors clustered on
Fama-French 49 industry and listing month. +, *, **, and *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.01% level, respectively. The sample is 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.






(20.96) (13.34) (21.78) (15.16)





(18.33) (-2.01) (19.02) (-2.06)











(-1.73) (-1.93) (-1.93) (-2.28) (-2.46) (-2.46)
SP500 -0.095 -0.078 -0.078 0.095 0.108 0.108























































(17.58) (16.51) (16.51) (3.25) (3.28) (3.28)
Adjusted R
2 0.366 0.369 0.369 0.497 0.498 0.498
40Table 7: Tests of the incentive eect (III): rst-day returns
Tests of the incentive eect using OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the rst-day return (IR1). All
variables are dened in Table 4. The control variables (not shown here) are the same as in table 5. The t-statistics
(in parenthesis) use standard errors clustered on Fama-French 49 industry and listing month. +, *, **, and ***
denotes signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.01% level, respectively. The sample is 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.














Private  LDS 0.0531 -0.475
 0.013
(1.38) (-4.14) (0.26)




Private  HDS  SP500NEG 1.304

(12.37)
Private  LDS  SP500POS 0.093
 0.080
(2.19) (1.45)























(3.46) (3.46) (3.78) (3.78)
Control variables: Y es Y es Y es Y es
Adjusted R
2 0.532 0.532 0.536 0.536
41Table 8: Tests of the demand eect (I): positive rst-day returns
Probit regressions testing for the demand eect. The dependent variable is a dummy for positive rst-day returns
(IR1POS). All variables are dened in Table 4. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are clustered on Fama-French 49 industry
and listing month. +, *, **, and *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.01% level, respectively. The
sample is 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.




















(6.61) (1.89) (6.85) (1.65)
Age 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.01) (-0.06) (0.00)












Rank 0.011 0.011 0.011
(1.36) (1.40) (1.39)
HighTech 0.062 0.071 0.064
(1.32) (1.51) (1.37)
Bubble -0.123 -0.075 -0.116
(-1.08) (-0.66) (-1.02)

















 0.123 0.140 0.093
(29.79) (14.63) (14.81) (0.27) (0.31) (0.21)
Pseudo R
2 0.119 0.117 0.120 0.127 0.124 0.128
42Table 9: Tests of the demand eect (II): positive rst-day returns
Probit regressions testing for the demand eect. The dependent variable is a dummy for positive rst-day returns
(IR1POS). All variables are dened in Table 4. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are clustered on Fama-French 49 industry
and listing month. +, *, **, and *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.01% level, respectively. The
sample is 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.




















(4.36) (1.93) (4.48) (1.69)
Age 0.000216 -0.000247 0.0000519
(0.01) (-0.01) (0.00)












Rank 0.0105 0.0110 0.0108
(1.36) (1.41) (1.39)
HighTech 0.0618 0.0663 0.0641
(1.32) (1.41) (1.37)
Bubble -0.123 -0.0972 -0.116
(-1.09) (-0.86) (-1.02)

















 0.123 0.127 0.0924
(29.79) (15.46) (14.79) (0.27) (0.28) (0.21)
Pseudo R
2 0.119 0.119 0.120 0.127 0.127 0.128
43Table 10: Tests of the demand eect (III): high- and low-demand state
Probit regressions testing for the demand eect. The dependent variable is a dummy for the high-demand state
(HDS) in columns 1-4, and for the low-demand state (LDS) in columns 5-8. All variables are dened in Table 4.
t-statistics (in parenthesis) are clustered on Fama-French 49 industry and listing month. +, *, **, and *** denotes
signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.01% level, respectively. The sample is 5,093 U.S. IPOs in 1981-2008.
HDS LDS


















(-4.64) (-4.72) (3.07) (3.17)
Primary -0.0260 -0.0171 0.00303 -0.00116
























(7.81) (7.97) (-3.98) (-4.09)
Bubble -0.173 -0.121 0.0412 -0.00982












(3.53) (3.44) (-2.57) (-2.33)
NY SE 0.153 0.148 -0.0878 -0.0708









(-13.16) (-12.17) (-11.10) (-11.22) (-8.50) (-1.43) (3.78) (3.70)
Pseudo R
2 0.013 0.012 0.265 0.263 0.016 0.012 0.220 0.217
44